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BODY AND SOUL: EQUALITY, PREGNANCY,
AND THE UNITARY RIGHT TO ABORTION
Jennifer S. Hendricks1
Abstract
This Article explores equality-based arguments for abortion
rights, revealing both their necessity and their pitfalls. It first uses the
narrowness of the “health exception” to abortion regulations to show
why equality arguments are needed—because our legal tradition's
conception of liberty is based on male experience, and we have no
theory of basic human rights grounded in women's reproductive
experiences. Next, however, the Article shows that equality
arguments, although necessary, can undermine women's reproductive
freedom because they require that pregnancy and abortion be
analogized to male experiences. The result is that equality arguments
focus on either the bodily or the social aspect of pregnancy, to the
detriment of the other. Most recently, for example, Jack Balkin has
argued that there are “two rights” to abortion, one based in the right
to bodily integrity and one based in the right to avoid motherhood.
This is the wrong way to theorize pregnancy. The body-focused
arguments fail to resonate with the reasons most women seek
abortions, and the role that pregnancy and abortion play in women’s
lives. The burden-of-motherhood arguments imply a sunset clause on
abortion rights and lend credibility to arguments for a right to “male
abortion.”
This division between the body and the social suggests that
women’s liberty can be protected only by breaking it into pieces that
have analogs in men’s experiences. When men are the norm,
women’s rights become derivative. Women’s rights would stand
more firmly on their own footing. The Article proposes a different
framework for theorizing pregnancy. While this understanding of
pregnancy could form the basis for yet more comparative equality
arguments, abortion is better understood through a liberty framework
developed directly from women’s experiences.
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HENDRICKS, BODY AND SOUL
If men could get pregnant,
abortion would be a sacrament.
—Florynce Kennedy2
But they cannot,3 so legal and political arguments about abortion
rights seek out ways to compare a pregnant woman to a man and
thereby make her situation comprehensible to liberal legal doctrine.
Such comparisons become especially important when abortion is
claimed not just as a privacy right but as a matter of equality. A
recurring debate since Roe v. Wade concerns the relative merits of
privacy and equality as theoretical explanation and doctrinal
justification for reproductive rights.4 This Article demonstrates a
paradox of the equality approach: Equality arguments are necessary
in order to establish women’s liberty rights in a legal tradition based
on male experience. However, because of the need for comparisons,
equality arguments also undermine the long-term goal of developing
a theory of liberty based on female experience rather than defining
women’s liberty as derivative of men’s.
Equality arguments for the right to abortion are typically either
body-focused or motherhood-focused. Some commentators have
2

Gloria Steinem, The Verbal Karate of Florynce Kennedy, Esq., MS. MAGAZINE
(Mar. 1973) (quoting Kennedy’s verbal statement).
3
Recent press reports of a pregnant man notwithstanding, this Article treats
pregnancy as a female experience because pregnancy and the capacity for
pregnancy are central to the cultural and legal construction of gender. “Men are
free to develop the technology to become mothers.” BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN,
RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL
SOCIETY 257 (1989). In addition, because this Article focuses on abortion rights,
vulnerability to accidental pregnancy is important.
4
See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261
(1992) (setting out a foundational equality argument for abortion rights); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1326-28 (1991) (advocating an equality approach); Ruth Colker, Equality Theory
and Reproductive Freedom, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 99 (1994) (same); Ruth Colker,
An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy:
Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 324 n.1, 356, 361 (1991) (
defending the equality approach and providing an illustration of a non-essentialist
equal protection argument for abortion rights); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 955 (1984) (proposing an equal protection
standard); Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law:
Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
Pol’y 419 (1995) (defending the privacy approach); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137
(advocating a dual approach).
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even suggested that there may be two distinct rights to abortion: one
based on the right to bodily integrity, and one based on privacy for
intimate family choices.5 My thesis is that such bifurcation is exactly
the wrong approach. The division is not based on women’s
experience of pregnancy but on the need to make that experience fit
into existing categories. True equality—which includes a nonderivative theory of women’s liberty—requires that reproductive
rights be theorized without reducing pregnancy to component parts
and shoe-horning it into doctrines developed without women in
mind. Pregnancy is a complex and multifaceted process, but it is
nonetheless a unitary experience. A woman’s right to liberty during
pregnancy is similarly unitary.
Part I of this Article summarizes the political basis for the
connection between sex equality and abortion rights. Part II reviews
the strengths and weaknesses of the two main types of equality
arguments for abortion rights. This critique leads to the conclusion
that the bifurcation between body-focused arguments and burdensof-motherhood arguments is itself a fatal flaw. Part III argues that
pregnancy should be recognized as an archetypal parental
relationship that incorporates a bodily relationship and a social one.
This recognition would build on Supreme Court precedent that uses
pregnancy as the baseline for a constitutional definition of
parenthood. Analogies that take the female experience as the baseline
can use equal protection analysis to construct a vision of fundamental
rights that puts women at the center. Part IV sketches two possible
equal protection arguments from this perspective but shows that the
persistent need to compare women’s experiences to men’s ultimately
undermines a more comprehensive approach to reproductive
freedom. The Article concludes that equality arguments are a
necessary tool for “getting there” from here but that they must be
used with caution and awareness that they are stepping stones, not
destinations, in the struggle for women’s human rights. A new effort
to theorize fundamental human rights, which feminists are just
beginning,6 is needed.
5

See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
340-52 (2007) (describing the “two rights to abortion”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 222 (discussing “Splitting the Woman’s
Right in Two”) (1992).
6
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive After All These
Years, in SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER _ (Joanna Grossman & Linda
McClain, eds., forthcoming 2009) (proposing “that one way to render equality less
illusive is to move beyond gender and build a more comprehensive framework on
the concept of universal human vulnerability”); Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing

4

HENDRICKS, BODY AND SOUL

I. THE INTUITION ABOUT EQUALITY AND ABORTION
Seventy-seven percent of anti-abortion leaders are men.
One hundred percent of them will never be pregnant.
—Planned Parenthood advertisement
As a matter of doctrine, abortion rights are part of the right to
privacy, an unenumerated right protected by the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 In Roe v. Wade,8 it was
not entirely clear to whom the privacy belonged. The leading
feminist criticism of Roe has long been that it reads like a manifesto
for doctors’ rights rather than women’s, suggesting that whether to
abort is the doctor’s call even when the reasons are non-medical. For
example, Roe concludes,
Th[is] decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment up to the points where important state interests
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to
those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.9

Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371,
380, 381-90 (1995) (sketching “a theory of the abortion decision and its
relationship to selfhood”).
7
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
1626-27 (2007) (applying Fourteenth Amendment precedent to a federal restriction
on abortion, thereby implicitly invoking Fifth Amendment).
8
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9
Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66. See also id. at 153 (stating that medical, psychological,
and social concerns are all “factors the woman and her responsible physician
necessarily will consider in consultation”); id. at 163 (stating that before viability,
abortion decision should be made by “the attending physician, in consultation with
his patient”). In fairness to the Roe Court, some of these statements seem to be
directed at state claims to be restricting abortion for the sake of women’s medical
safety. The Court may have emphasized the doctor’s clinical judgment in part to
rebut such claims. While the paternalism is rank, Roe need not necessarily be read
to designate the doctor as the primary constitutional decision-maker. But see Erin
Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (1995) (“Under Roe,
the physician … is constitutionally required to lead the decisionmaking process.”).
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In this respect, Roe might truly have been the progeny of Lochner v.
New York,10 protecting doctors’ right to contract to perform medical
services rather than women’s right to control their pregnancies.
Over the years, however, the Supreme Court came to see the
choice as belonging to the pregnant woman. Justice Blackmun, the
author of Roe, tentatively claimed the ground of women’s equality
rights in a 1986 decision, then staked it firmly in 1989, in a
passionate dissent from the first major decision undercutting Roe.11
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,12 the Court’s partial affirmation of Roe grounded the abortion
right squarely in women’s liberty. Ironically, this shift from doctors’
rights to women’s rights accompanied a substantial curtailment of
the scope of the right.13 Casey also acknowledged the increasingly
prevalent view that abortion rights were linked to sex equality.14
The intuition that abortion rights are part of sex equality has
been elaborated in both political and legal forms. Second-wave
feminists15 assumed, and sometimes articulated, a strong connection
between abortion rights and sex equality.16 Although feminists
10

198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down protective labor laws because they interfered
with freedom of contract).
11
See Thornburgh v. Amer. Col. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (“Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central
part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.”); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537-38 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I fear for the liberty and equality of the
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the sixteen years since Roe
was decided.”).
12
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13
Casey replaced strict scrutiny of abortion restrictions with the “undue burden”
analysis. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78; see also PEGGY COOPER DAVIS,
NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 209 (1998)
(stating that one objective of the Casey plurality was to “reduce the level of
constitutional protection for pregnant women seeking autonomy in the
management of their pregnancies”).
14
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850, 856, 860, discussed infra, notes __ and
accompanying text.
15
Occurring between 1918 and 1968, second-wave feminism “was concerned with
social reform (such as free school meals for poor children, and health care for poor
women) and ‘revolution’ in the private sphere: the right to contraception, the end
of the sexual double standard, and so on.” SARA DELAMONT, FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY
2 (2003).
16
See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, (hereinafter Siegel,
Symposium), 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 826-28 (2007) (stating that Second Wave
feminists connected abortion to equality); Law, Rethinking, at 972 (noting that
abortion was a central focus of the second wave).
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strategically severed the abortion debate from the debate over the
Equal Rights Amendment,17 abortion has remained the defining,
litmus-test issue for many advocates of women’s equality.18
Abortion, however, has not always been embraced as a feminist
issue. In the eighteenth century, doctors promoting the
criminalization of abortion were the first to link abortion (and
contraception) to equality.19 First-wave feminists20 in the United
States expressed sympathy for women who sought abortions, but
publicly opposed both abortion and contraception.21 The feminist
goal of “voluntary motherhood” meant the right of married women to
refuse sexual intercourse.22 More recently, most feminists have
concluded that sexuality is too integral to human flourishing for the
right to say “no”—even if always and everywhere respected—to be
the sine qua non of women’s control over reproduction.23 Indeed, at
times, leaders of the second wave have been criticized for focusing
17

See Siegel, Symposium, at 826-28 (stating that feminists followed Roe in
separating abortion rights from sex equality for strategic reasons).
18
See, e.g., Katha Pollit, Feminists for (Fetal) Life, THE NATION (Aug. 11, 2005)
(answering “no” to the question “Can you be a feminist and be against abortion?”).
EMILY’s List, a leading feminist political fundraising organization, has three
requirements for the candidates it will support at all levels of government: they
must be women, Democrats, and pro-choice. See
www.emilyslist.org/about/mission (visited 8/14/09).
19
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 280-323 (describing the nineteenth-century doctors’
campaign to criminalize abortion); see also ROTHMAN, at 188 (“I do not believe
that the shifting image, from mother as protector to mother as potential enemy of
her children, represents a change in maternal behavior or protectiveness. I believe
it represents, among other things, a response to the feminist movement. If women
can look out for our own interests, then, some fear, perhaps we cannot be trusted to
look out for the interests of our children.”).
20
“First Wave feminism, from about 1848 to 1918, focused on getting women
rights in public spheres, especially the vote, education and entry to middle-class
jobs such as medicine. The views of these feminists, at least as they expressed
them in public, were puritan about sex, alcohol, dress, and behaviour.” DELAMONT,
supra note __, at 2.
21
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 304-06 (stating that nineteenth century feminists
blamed abortion on “the social conditions in which women conceived and raised
children”).
22
See Linda Gordon, Voluntary Motherhood; The Beginnings of Feminist Birth
Control Ideas in the United States, FEMINIST STUD., Winter-Spring 1973, at 5, 5
(discussing voluntary motherhood as “an initial response of feminists to their
understanding that involuntary motherhood and child-raising were important parts
of woman’s oppression”).
23
See Siegel, Symposium, at 817 (observing that proponents of a sex equality basis
for abortion rights generally view “sexual intimacy as a human need worthy of
fulfillment”).
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too narrowly on abortion rights at the expense of other goals.24
Among those is the goal of allowing women to have children secure
in the knowledge that they will not have to look on as poverty and
discrimination crush those children’s bodies and spirits.25
Some of the best evidence of the relationship between abortion
rights and sex equality is negative evidence—not an affirmative
account of women’s liberty but an observation that opponents of sex
equality generally oppose abortion as well. The social practice of
restricting abortion is closely associated with traditional attitudes
about women’s roles and with efforts to control women’s sexuality.26
Although concern for fetal life is the primary articulated argument
against abortion, that concern typically either masks or works in
tandem with prescriptions for women’s roles.27
Feminists have long pointed out that public judgments about on
abortion often turn on a moral judgments about the woman’s sexual

24

See, e.g., Colker, Equality Theory (criticizing Laurence Tribe’s work on abortion
as “narrowly pro-choice”); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1318 (“The right to
reproductive control I have in mind would include the abortion right but would not
center on it.”.); cf. Allen, The Fix, at 454 (stating that her support for public
funding of abortion is circumspect because “the history of slavery and medical
abuse of women and people of color” raises concerns about “the appearance or
reality of compulsory abortion”).
25
Cf. MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1295 (“[Feminist activists] have moved from a
request to be permitted to play by the rules of the game to an understanding that
having no say in the rules means not being permitted to play the game.”);
ROTHMAN, at 154 (“Women who do not want a maternity experience essentially
comparable to what men's experience with fatherhood has been may find that the
dominant thinking in the feminist movement does not represent their concerns.”);
Colker, An EP Analysis, at 327 (“[T]he popularity of the abortion debate is a
reflection of the problem of essentialism because this debate chooses one issue for
debate—abortion—and generally ignores the larger and more complex problems
relating to reproductive health issues, of which pregnancy is only one part.”).
26
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 327-28 (summarizing findings from KRISTIN LUKER,
ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)).
27
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 359-62 (arguing that banning abortion in order to
protect fetal life “entails a purely functional use of the pregnant woman,” requiring
one to ask, “What view of women prompted the state’s decision to use them as a
means to an end?”); see also id. at 335 (“The risk of harm to unborn life, and of
bias against women in actions undertaken to prevent it, may each be real. To see
how unexamined assumptions about women's obligations as mothers can shape
fetal-protective regulation, it is necessary to consider the methods and resources
this society employs to prevent harm to the unborn.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality
in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992) (“[T]he problem lies in turning women’s
sexuality and reproductive capacity into objects for the control and use of others.”).
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conduct rather than on the moral status of the fetus.28 For example,
many abortion bans may provide exceptions for cases of rape. The
fetus that results from a rape is no less alive than any other,
suggesting that the real concern is the woman’s culpability for
voluntary sex. Even this characterization may be too generous: Since
the law defines rape from the perpetrator’s perspective,29 it is more
accurate to say that the right to abortion depends on the culpability of
the man, not the woman. The rape exception thus represents a
judgment about which men are entitled to have women forced to bear
their children.
Other justifications for abortion restrictions are similarly
suspect. For example, in the early twenty-first century, abortion
opponents have drawn more from some of the rhetoric of the First
Wave, arguing that women need to be protected from abortion.30
These arguments are based on traditional, paternalistic views that
women should be protected from poor decisions, or from coercion,
by eliminating their choices rather than informing and empowering
their decisions.31 The fetus has moral status, the man has moral
agency, and the woman remains a passive vessel.
This resonance with traditional sex stereotypes is a hallmark of
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.32 Yet equal
28

Roe mentioned this point. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 57 n. 54) (1973). See also
Siegel, Reasoning, at 364; Balkin, Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S
MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 49 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005) (hereinafter WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID); but see Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion
Concurring in Roe, Dissenting in Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID, at 159 (rebutting this argument by invoking the legislature’s prerogative to
balance competing interests).
29
See MacKinnon, Reflection, at 1303-04 (“Crystallizing in doctrine a norm that
animates the rape law more generally, the defense of ‘mistaken belief of consent’
defined whether a rape occurred from the perspective of the accused rapist, not
from the perspective of the victim or even based on a social standard of
unacceptable force or of mutuality.”).
30
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (arguing that Congress
should be able to restrict abortion because women’s consent may not be adequately
informed and because they may later regret their decisions); see generally Reva B.
Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of WomanProtective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (documenting and
analyzing the political use of such arguments).
31
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 183-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s paternalistic attitude toward women).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1986) (stating that
“generalizations” about sex differences cannot justify excluding all women from
military academy).
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protection arguments for reproductive rights have only barely gained
traction in court. One reason for this failure is that courts do not
analyze potential stereotypes behind a law until they first determine
that the law classifies individuals on the basis of sex. “The point [is]
to apply existing law to women as if women were citizens—as if the
doctrine was not gendered to women's disadvantage, as if the legal
system had no sex, as if women were gender-neutral persons
temporarily trapped by law in female bodies.”33 Under the notorious
holding of Geduldig v. Aillieo,34 regulation of pregnancy is deemed
not to be sex-specific: no sex classification, hence no equal
protection analysis.35 Because there are no pregnant men who are
accorded greater rights than pregnant women, the doctrine largely
fails to see an equality problem.
In response to this doctrinal dead end, many proponents of
reproductive rights have tried to show that pregnant women are, in
fact, treated differently from similarly situated men. To do so, they
have followed the example of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(“PDA”).36 The PDA overruled Geduldig in the employment context,
declaring that pregnant women on the job must be treated the same
as men who are similarly situated with respect to the physical
demands of the work.37 Pregnant women are thus classified with
other workers experiencing temporary disability. Equality arguments
for abortion similarly seek comparisons with male experience by
describing pregnancy at a higher level of generality.38
Through these comparisons, feminists are reaching for a more
affirmative account of abortion and equality. Rather than focusing on
the impermissible motives that lie behind the restrictions, they show
the importance of abortion rights by comparing women’s experience
of forced pregnancy and childbirth to experiences that men can also
have. While the comparisons often appear strained, some such
comparisons appear to be necessary in order for abortion to be
legally recognizable as an equality problem.
It is revealing that an issue felt to be so central to women’s
equality is so difficult to express in the language of constitutional
doctrine that purports to guarantee the equal protection of the laws.
33

MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1286.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
35
Id. at 496 n. 20.
36
42 U.S.C. § 2500e(k).
37
Id.
38
On the non-linearity of the paths among levels of generality, see LAURENCE
TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1991).
34
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As Catharine MacKinnon has explained, the law cannot see the sex
discrimination in practices that are done only to women, because
equality is violated only when there is a similarly situated man who
is treated differently.39 To make an equality argument, one has to
move to a higher level of abstraction, arguing, for example, that
women and men must be accorded equal dignity as citizens.40 That
then requires a further argument about why women’s dignity
demands control over pregnancy.41 When the comparisons run this
far afield, the subject under discussion is no longer equality but
women’s autonomy and dignity. Those should not have to be
derivative of men’s experiences. Our constitutional discourse,
however, has no tradition defining human dignity from a female
perspective. 42 Ultimately, we need a concept of human rights not
that “includes” women but that comes from, is based on, and meets
the needs of women. In the meantime, we may need the ratchet of
equality analysis to translate women’s fundamental dignity into
something that resembles men’s.43 When men are the baseline,
equality analysis helps grope toward a different discourse.
39

See, e..g, MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1288-89 (observing that under formal
equality principles, where women are perceived as unlike men, “discrimination as
a legal theory does not even come up”).
40
See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning, at 322-23.
41
See id.
42
See ROTHMAN, at 59 (“Motherhood is the embodied challenge to liberal
philosophy, and that, I fear, is why a society founded on and committed to liberal
philosophical principles cannot deal well with motherhood.”); Hanigsberg,
Homologizing at 386 (“As philosopher Susan Bordo observes, ‘[O]ntologically
speaking, the pregnant woman has been seen by our legal system as the mirrorimage of the abstract subject whose bodily integrity the law is so determined to
protect ….’”) (quoting Susan Bordo, Are Mothers Persons? Reproductive Rights
and the Politics of Subjectivity, in UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN
CULTURE, AND THE BODY 79 (1993)); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1315 (“Women
have not been considered ‘persons’ by law very long; the law of persons arguably
does not recognize the requisites of female personhood yet.”).
Much of the legal academic literature about abortion is by men because Roe v.
Wade—like Brown v. Board of Education—is an important test case and proving
ground for interpretive theories. See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning; Sunstein,
Neutrality. Thus, even the most empathetic and well-intentioned treatments of
abortion in the legal literature can sound like any other group of men defining their
culture by how they treat their women.
43
Cf. Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1323
(2004) (“The Court [in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)] uses the Equal
Protection Clause as a kind of rights ratchet to expand the universe of people
entitled to exercise the liberty interest established by Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)].”); compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (rejecting
woman’s privacy challenge to forced sterilization) with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
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II. BODIES AND BURDENS: TWO TAKES ON
ABORTION AS AN EQUALITY RIGHT
Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions.
—Planned Parenthood v. Casey44
As the Court explained in Casey, the right to abortion fits
squarely within two intersecting categories of protected rights: the
right to bodily integrity and the right to privacy in making intimate
family choices.45 Instead of making the right to abortion doubly
strong, however, that intersectionality illustrates the degree to which
reproductive freedom must be justified in terms of traditional
categories that emerged from men’s concerns.46
Despite the protection afforded by Roe/Casey, the doctrinal
limits of the abortion right illustrate that women’s liberty is shaky
ground for a fundamental right. Women’s need to control their
bodies and lives has to be buttressed by specific comparisons to
men’s experiences. Otherwise, the harms of forced maternity are
invisible.
Such comparisons tend to emphasize either the bodily
imposition of forced pregnancy or the disproportionate social
burdens of motherhood. Each approach has its own pitfalls, mainly
stemming from the fact that each emphasizes one aspect of
pregnancy to the detriment of the other. While each kind of
comparison illuminates part of why reproductive rights are central to
women’s equality, both suffer from the fact that they are driven by
the need to justify women’s liberty in terms of men’s experiences.

U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down sterilization on equal protection grounds); but see
MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1313 (“It has been held illegal to sterilize a male
prisoner but legal to sterilize a mentally disabled woman.”).
44
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
45
Id.
46
Cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,
1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139 (demonstrating that people who are discriminated against
because of a combination of marked characteristics receive less protection under
civil rights laws).
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A. BODY-FOCUSED ARGUMENTS: ARGUING EQUALITY
WHEN WOMEN’S LIBERTY IS NOT ENOUGH
Bodily integrity is a fundamental privacy right and an important
aspect of the right to abortion.47 Privacy-based abortion doctrine
most expressly acknowledges the right to bodily integrity through the
“health exception.” The health exception is a limited right to medical
self-defense and a narrow caveat to the state’s power to regulate all
abortions and to ban post-viability abortions.48 A diminished right to
bodily integrity is thus incorporated into the health exception from
the outset: it is a right of survival, not autonomy.49 The doctrinal
evolution of the health exception thus illustrates how a liberty right
can be weakened when applied to women as a special case. This
weakening creates the need for additional arguments, especially
equality arguments.
Under the rubric of equality, feminists have constructed broader
arguments that focus on the body but not necessarily on heightened
medical risk. To go beyond the health exception, these arguments
appeal to the general principle that the government cannot force one
person to assist another physically: abortion bans wrongly and
uniquely force pregnant women to be Good Samaritans. These
equality arguments are necessary because women’s bodily integrity
is not enough, standing alone, to justify protection under the
prevailing legal regime.
1.

The Health Exception: Women’s Liberty Is Not Enough

The health exception, taken seriously, could do as much as
Casey does to protect the right to choose an abortion. The fact that it
does not reveals the limits of a pure autonomy or pure privacy
approach to abortion rights in a legal system not premised on
women’s full humanity.
Casey held that a pregnant woman has the right to decide
whether to have an abortion before the fetus is capable of living
outside the womb.50 Even after the point of viability, a woman is
entitled to seek an abortion if continuation of the pregnancy threatens

47

See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)
(aligning the abortion right with precedent protecting the right to bodily integrity).
48
See id. at 846 (summarizing the core aspects of the abortion right).
49
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 365 (arguing that health exceptions define a woman’s
liberty interest as an interest in “brute survival”).
50
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming Roe’s holding that a woman has the right to
choose an abortion before viability).
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her life or health.51 An immediate threat to life or health will also
entitle a woman to an exemption from most restrictions on previability abortion, such as a waiting period or parental consent
requirement.52
The idea of a health exception, however broad or narrow,
incorporates an implicit distinction between normal pregnancy and
the complications of pregnancy. That distinction renders invisible the
inherent risks and physical burdens of all pregnancies.
Casey’s protection of women’s health is limited by this implicit
distinction. At issue in Casey was Pennsylvania’s definition of a
medical emergency sufficient to waive restrictions such as parental
consent, waiting periods, and post-viability prohibition of abortion:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's good
faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition
of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion
of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will
create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment
of a major bodily function.53
The only challenge to this provision even considered in Casey was
that it failed to cover three specific conditions. Those three
conditions develop gradually; the statute thus appeared to require
postponing the abortion until the inevitable moment of crisis. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute by reading out the immediacy
requirement and thus declaring those three conditions to be covered.
It retained the requirement of “substantial and irreversible”
consequences.54 Casey’s health exception thus protects not a
woman’s health but her interest in “brute survival.”55
51

Id. (confirming “the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the
law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or
health”).
52
Id. at 880 (stating that an “essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere
with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her
pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health”). The text says “most” rather
than “all” because of Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a ban
on a particular abortion procedure, without a health exception).
53
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990), quoted in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (emphasis added).
54
Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
55
Siegel, Reasoning, at 365 (discussing health exception in Utah abortion law). In
2007, the legal academy was largely appalled to learn that “permanent impairment
of a significant body function” had been adopted as part of the official U.S.
definition of torture. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memo. for
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense Re: Military
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The high threshold for the Casey health exception plays to a
supposed distinction between good reasons for having an abortion
and frivolous ones. In Roe v. Wade, the dissent complained,
At the heart of the controversy … are those recurring
pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or
health of the mother. . . . [The majority] values the
convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more
than the life or potential life of the fetus . . . . 56
Even setting aside the very large gap between danger to health and
convenience, whim, or caprice, there is no such thing as a pregnancy
that poses “no danger whatsoever” to a woman’s health.57
Every pregnancy has the potential to become a complicated
pregnancy over the course of nine months of dramatic physiological
changes. The mere fact of pregnancy increases the woman’s chances

Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the U.S, at 37-38. (Mar.
14, 2003). Although the OLC Memo was retracted, Casey is good law. The Casey
health exception thus protects pregnant women from being forced by the state to
endure physical consequences that the George W. Bush Administration would
define as torture. Unlike members of al Qaeda, pregnant women are not necessarily
protected from psychological harm. See Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof. Corp.,
523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari
on the question whether mental health must be part of any health exception).
56
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 219, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57
Even supporters of abortion rights can overlook the risks of normal pregnancy.
For example, in Abortion and Original Meaning, Jack Balkin recognized that
abortion bans “require a woman’s body to undergo the strains of pregnancy and the
difficulties of childbirth without her consent.” Balkin, Original Meaning, at 323.
Yet, when he articulated the right to abortion, he argued that there are two distinct
rights to abortion: The first is a right to bodily integrity that works out to be
equivalent to the health exception. The second is a right to avoid motherhood,
which focuses on post-birth responsibilities that are disproportionately borne by
women. Id. at 342-43. Lost in this division are the risks and burdens of normal
pregnancy. Dawn Johnsen pointed out this omission in her comment on Balkin’s
article. See Dawn Johnsen, The Progressive Political Power of Balkin’s “Original
Meaning”, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 423-24 (2008). In reply, Balkin amended
his description of the second right to abortion to include the burdens of pregnancy.
See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constituional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 528 (2008). This amendment, however, undermines his equality
justification for the second right, which blames societal discrimination for making
women bear the disproportionate burden of child-rearing. See id. at 529
(“Nevertheless, the second right is premised on a background of social
expectations and technological possibilities.”). Society cannot be blamed for men’s
immunity from unintended pregnancy. This is not to say that Balkin is dismissive
of that burden in the fashion of the Roe dissent, only that the burden is often and
easily overlooked.
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of death or long-term detriment health.58 Once pregnancy has begun,
abortion is statistically safer than carrying to term until well into the
second trimester.59 On top of the risk of complications is the physical
burden of normal pregnancy itself. Many other symptoms—nausea,
vomiting, back pain, sleeplessness—would not ordinarily be
considered “healthy” but are within the range of “normal” for a
pregnant woman.60 At a minimum, carrying a pregnancy to term
entails a 100% risk of either severe uterine contractions and painful
dilation of the cervix, or major abdominal surgery. Childbirth is a
journey to the boundary between life and death, a place where a lot
can go wrong.
If “health” referred to the likely medical outcomes of early
abortion as compared to continued pregnancy, the health exception
would swallow Casey. But the perspective of the Roe dissent—that
the normal risks of pregnancy are women’s lot—remains enshrined
in Casey‘s health exception. Although Casey acknowledged that a
pregnant woman “is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain” and that her sacrifice “ennobles her,” those sufferings were
defined out of the health exception.61
Before Casey, the Supreme Court had at least suggested that a
woman’s right to defend her health was more complete. Even before
Roe, in United States v. Vuitch,62 the Court had construed a statutory
health exception to include a broad concept of mental health.63 After
Roe, in Colautti v. Franklin,64 the Court strongly suggested that the
state could not require “trade-offs” between fetal and maternal
health.65 Although it ultimately resolved Colautti on vagueness
grounds, the Court was sharply critical of the possibility that a
particular abortion technique had to be “indispensable” rather than
58

See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95
YALE L.J. 639, 640 n. 9 (1986) (collecting statistics and calculating that as of 1983,
abortion was safer than childbirth until at least week 21); see also Council on
Scientific Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Induced Termination of Pregnancy
Before and After Roe v. Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity of Women,
268 JAMA 3231, 3232 (1992).
59
See Rhoden, Trimesters, at 640 n. 9.
60
See Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, __ (forthcoming) (describing symptoms
and risks of pregnancy).
61
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
62
402 U.S. 62 (1971).
63
Id. at 72. The challenge in Vuitch was that the law’s reference to “health” was
vague.
64
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
65
Id. at 400.
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“merely desirable” in order to be used.66 The courts, along with the
medical profession, was moving toward the view that the pregnant
woman rather than the fetus was the patient.67 For the state to
balance the woman’s health against “additional percentage points of
fetal survival” raised “[s]erious ethical and constitutional
difficulties.”68
Casey’s ratification of the “substantial and irreversible
impairment” standard was thus a significant retreat. The immediately
apparent impact of that retreat, however, was cushioned by the nature
of the challenge in that case. In Casey, the health exception was
relevant only to post-viability abortions and to cases in which
parental consent or a twenty-four hour waiting period would
otherwise be required. A higher threshold of medical risk makes
somewhat more sense in this context.69 Planned Parenthood
implicitly conceded that a narrow health exception was acceptable by
arguing only that the phrasing of the statute failed to cover particular
conditions that were also substantial and irreversible. By loosely
construing the statute, the Court was able to dismiss this challenge
with the blithe reassurance that “significant threat[s]” would be
covered. Because of this assurance, and because the health exception
did not pertain to whether an adult woman could obtain a pre-

66

Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79
(1976).
67
See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (holding that district court
erred in granting hospital’s petition for court-ordered cesarean based on statistical
trade-offs regarding maternal and fetal survival). On the importance of allowing
the individual to make such decisions, see ROTHMAN, at 193 (“We cannot know
who will be right, but we do know that, inevitably, anyone making these decisions
will sometimes be wrong. To me, it comes down not to whose judgment we trust,
but whose mistakes. … Why, then, do I trust the idiosyncratic mistakes of parents?
Precisely because they are idiosyncratic. The mistakes of medicine and those of the
state are systematic, and that alone is reason not to trust.”); cf. Jennifer S.
Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 462-65
(2007) (discussing de-centralization of parenting decisions as a key reason for
Fourteenth Amendment protection of parental rights). On the deterioration of
respect for women’s autonomy in areas such as court-ordered c-sections as well as
abortion, see Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 COLO. L. REV. _, _
(forthcoming).
68
Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400.
69
See Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle Over
Late-Term Abortion, 10 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 397, 405 (1998) (arguing that the
standard for abortion-related health concerns should vary over the course of
pregnancy, as birth gradually becomes safer than abortion).
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viability abortion, a woman still had the final say on any necessary
trade-offs between herself and the fetus.
Since Casey, the Court has not had to face hard questions about
the scope of the health exception precisely because of the relatively
unfettered right to choose abortion before viability. Viability occurs
at roughly twenty-three to twenty-four weeks after the woman’s last
menstrual period.70 After sixteen weeks, and certainly after twentytwo, hard questions about the health exception are increasingly less
likely to arise. The later in pregnancy an abortion occurs, the more
likely it was a wanted or welcomed pregnancy. In those cases, the
woman herself is likely to seek an abortion only after the onset of
serious complications. Similarly, doctors are increasingly reluctant to
perform abortions as pregnancy progresses, and in most cases
delivery eventually becomes medically safer than abortion.71 The
fact that the woman has the right to choose abortion for any reason
before viability avoids the question of how much risk is necessary to
trigger the health exception. The right to elective abortion has thus
suspended much of the pre-Roe debate over the medial conditions
that justify therapeutic abortion.72
This hiatus would come to an end if the right to elective abortion
were eliminated. Presumably, a woman would retain the right to an
abortion when pregnancy endangered her life or health. The Supreme
Court would then find itself thrust into a revival of the debate over
what kind and magnitude of risk is necessary to invoke the
constitutionally required health exception.73 Abortion opponents fear
that “health” would be broadly defined to include, perhaps, not only

70

See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
See Rhoden, Trimesters, at 640 n. 9.
72
See, e.g., U.S. v. Vuitch 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (analyzing health exception for
vagueness).
73
This debate remains alive in other countries with stricter limits on abortion.
Where abortion opponents have reacted to perceived “abuse” of both health and
life exceptions by banning all abortions, the result is that doctors have, in some
cases, refused to treat a woman in the midst of miscarriage until they could confirm
fetal death. In at least one documented case, doctors prolonged the delay by giving
a woman drugs to stop her contractions, and she died from lack of treatment. See
MICHELLE GOLDBERG, THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION: SEX, POWER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD 13 (2008). Even defenders of such laws, who say that
refusal to treat a miscarriage is a mistake, suggest that, late in pregnancy, the
doctor should save the baby at the woman’s expense if the baby has a better chance
of survival. Id. at 30-31; cf. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) discussed
supra note _.
71
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slightly above-average physical risks but even the risks inherent in
pregnancy or the mental distress of an unwanted pregnancy.74
This fear is well-grounded in pre-Roe decisions about abortion.
In Vuitch, the pre-Roe case challenging a health exception as vague,
the Supreme Court read “health” to include mental health, “whether
or not the patient had a previous history of mental defects.”75 The
clear implication of the government’s concern with lack of prior
diagnosis was that mental health was too malleable to limit a
woman’s choice to abort. Indeed, in dissent Justice Douglas bore out
the state’s concern by demonstrating that malleability:
How likely must death be? Must death be certain if the
abortion is not performed? Is it enough that the woman could
not undergo birth without an ascertainably higher possibility
of death than would normally be the case? What if the woman
threatened suicide if the abortion was not performed? … Is it
sufficient if having the child will shorten the life of the
woman by a number of years? ...
A doctor may well remove an appendix far in advance of
rupture in order to prevent a risk that may never materialize.
May he act in a similar way under this abortion statute? …
Is any unwanted pregnancy a ‘health’ factor because it is a
source of anxiety? …
Would a doctor be violating the law if he performed an
abortion because the added expense of another child in the
family would drain its resources, leaving an anxious mother
with an insufficient budget to buy nutritious food?76
74

See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[D]emanding a ‘health exception’—which requires the abortionst to assure
himself that, in his expert medical judgment, this method is, in the case at hand,
marginally safer than others …—is to give live-birth abortion free rein.”); Brian
W. Clowes, The Role Of Maternal Deaths In The Abortion Debate, 13 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 371 (1993) (“The potential for abuse of the term ‘mental
health’ is even greater than misuse of the term ‘physical health’ where abortion is
concerned. When a definite physical indication for abortion cannot be ascertained,
it is a simple matter to use virtually any rationalization to justify an abortion for the
mother's mental health.”). Cf. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CONSTITUTION OF
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 (2006),
http://www.who.int/entity/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (“Health is a
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity.”).
75
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72.
76
Id. at 75-76 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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Justice Douglas concluded that “health” was infinitely malleable to
fit the moral views of jurors and was therefore an unconstitutional
standard.77 Should Roe/Casey be overruled, one of the next battles in
the abortion wars will be a renewal of this debate over the scope of
the health exception.78
The Supreme Court has already begun laying the groundwork
for a narrow health exception that forces women to bear the risks of
normal pregnancy and at least some complications. In Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart II),79 the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, which contains a life exception but not a health
exception. The Act bans a particular method of surgical abortion.
Surgical abortions are use in the second trimester, when about 10-15
percent percent of all abortions in the United States are performed.80
The most common procedure is called dilation and extraction, or
D&E.81 In some cases, a doctor may keep the fetus intact (and living)
until the end of the procedure in order to minimize the use of sharp
instruments inside the uterus. This approach is called intact D&E.82
Congress deemed in “partial birth” abortion, and it is banned by the
Act. In Carhart II, the government justified the Act’s lack of health
exception in part on the grounds that intact D&E is never safer than
available alternatives; thus no health exception is needed. Never did
the government explain why the statute nonetheless has a life
exception—how could the procedure be necessary, in some cases, to
save a woman’s life but never necessary to prevent injury short of
death?
The answer is that the Act’s proponents did not want minor
health concerns—i.e., anything short of death—to be used to invoke
77

Id.
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51
(1992) (suggesting that if Roe were overruled, the right to abortion might still exist
“in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own
life or health, or is the result of rape or incest”).
79
550 U.S. 124 (2007). Carhart I was Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
In Carhart I, the Court struck down Nebraska’s ban on partial-birth abortion
because the description of the prohibited procedure was vague and because of the
lack of health exception. Carhart II concluded that Congress had cured any
vagueness problems and that congressional findings were adequate to demonstrate
that a health exception was unnecessary, at least for purposes of a facial challenge.
Both decisions were 5 to 4. Justice O’Connor had voted with the majority in
Carhart I. She retired and was replaced by Justice Alito, who voted with the
majority in Carhart II.
80
See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 134.
81
Id. at 135.
82
Id. at 136, 161.
78
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the health exception.83 To prevent such abuse, the Act places
women’s lives but not their health above the government’s distaste
for a particular abortion procedure. If Roe/Casey is overruled and
abortion rights are limited to the health exception, Carhart II will be
used to justify a high standard of medical risk that will substantially
exceed the difference between the risks of normal pregnancy and the
risks of early abortion. Only “significant threat[s]” to a woman’s
health will be adequate to overcome her duty to the fetus and the
state.84 Carhart II also establishes substantial deference to the
legislature in assessing those risks contrary to medical opinions, let
alone the pregnant woman’s opinion based on her own consideration
of medical data and other factors.85
In sum, the health exception is not intended to acknowledge that
normal pregnancy itself is a substantial drain on a woman’s health.
Indeed, that risk is obscured by the existence of a health exception
distinct from the general Roe/Casey right to abortion. Bearing
83

Testimony before Congress suggested that the Act’s proponents would have
preferred to omit the life exception as well. See Oliveri, Crossing the Line, at 40809 (collecting examples from congressional testimony indicating that a good
mother would sacrifice herself for her fetus) (“The argument seems to be that, as
long as a maternal health problem poses no risk to the health of the fetus, the
woman is seeking an ‘elective’ abortion if it is to save her own health.”); The Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, C.J.,
dissenting) (“These statutes … are concerned with making a statement in an
ongoing war for public opinion, though an incidental effect may be to discourage
some late-term abortions. The statement is that fetal life is more valuable than
women's health.”), vacated, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000); cf. Reva
Siegel, Concurring Opinion, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 78
(quoting Eugene Quay, Justifiable Abortion, 49 GEO. L.J. 173, 234 (1961) : “A
mother who would sacrifice the life of her unborn child for her own health is
lacking in something. If there could be any authority to destroy an innocent life for
social considerations, it would still be in the interests of society to sacrifice such a
mother rather than the child who might otherwise prove to be normal and decent
and an asset.”).
84
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 550 U.S. 833, 880 (1992).
85
The same derogation of women’s interest in, and control over, their own health
is also evident in other, related areas of law. For example, under no circumstances
will a court order that a parent be forced to submit to surgery—say to donate bone
marrow—for the benefit of a born child. Yet courts seriously consider and
sometimes grant petitions to force pregnant women to submit to surgery for the
purported benefit of their fetuses. See generally Burkstrand-Reid, Invisible Woman
at _; cf. Sylvia Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be
Supported, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 345 (2008) (discussing medical
and non-medical factors a woman might consider in choosing between vaginal
birth and scheduled c-section).
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children is such a normalized aspect of what women are for that state
imposition of the typical risks of pregnancy is inadequate to invoke a
woman’s right to protect her bodily integrity. Something more is
needed to demonstrate that this imposition is contrary to human
rights. Enter equality.
2.

The Good Samaritan Argument

Because the Roe/Casey health exception is not meant to reach
early abortion of a normal pregnancy, several commentators have
developed more extensive moral arguments for a woman’s right not
to carry the physical burden of the state’s claimed interest in
potential life. These arguments apply to the physical burden of a
typical pregnancy. Their main feature is an analogy between
pregnancy and other situations in which the law declines to impose
similar burdens. When presented in legal form, this analogy sounds
in equal protection rather than privacy. This approach illustrates how
equality principles can serve as a ratchet to broaden the law’s
conception of fundamental rights to include women’s experiences.
At the same time, the limits of the analogies illustrate some of the
limits of the equality approach.
The most famous of the body-focused argument is Judith Jarvitz
Thomson’s A Defense of Abortion.86 Thomson’s essay presents an
ethical case against requiring pregnant women to be Good
Samaritans, even assuming that a fetus has the same moral status as a
born person. Among several other analogies, Thomson asks us to
consider a person’s rights and duties if she is kidnapped by the
Society of Music Lovers and turned into a life support system for a
famous violinist. The violinist can survive only if the kidnapping
victim remains hooked up for nine months. Thomson argues that she
has the right to unplug herself, even if doing so will cause the
violinist’s death. Eileen McDonagh has translated Thomson’s ethical
argument into legal terms.87 Going further than Thomson in some

86

Judith Jarvitz Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
See EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK (1996). See
also, e.g., Donald Reagan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979);
Siegel, Reasoning, at 342 (observing that “selective regulation of women’s conduct
is justified on the grounds that pregnant women have a unique physical capacity to
harm children, when the regulation may in fact reflect the view that pregnant
women have a unique social obligation to protect children”) (discussing forced
cesareans, other medical interventions, and regulation and prosecution of women
for fetal neglect).
87
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respects, she argues that an unwillingly pregnant woman is a
“Captive Samaritan” to whom the state owes a duty of rescue. 88
The strength of Thomson’s violinist analogy lies in its demand
that we contemplate the physical risks and burdens of pregnancy in a
new context, where unconscious assumptions about the normalcy of
pregnancy do not apply. Stripped of these assumptions, the health
risks of pregnancy clearly exceed any burdens the law ordinarily
imposes on unwilling individuals, even to further the state interest in
the life of another.89 Translating this analogy into the language of
equal protection, McDonagh makes a convincing case for an
affirmative obligation on the part of the state to provide (and pay for)
abortions, just as it pays for law enforcement to respond when one
person attempts to capture and make use of the body of another.
While a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion may be a legally
justified “Bad Samaritan,” a woman who cannot afford an abortion is
a “Captive Samaritan” to whom the state owes the same duty of
rescue as other captives.90
Another strength of the Good Samaritan argument is that it
allows for the possibility that the fetus has substantial moral status,
perhaps the same moral status as a born person, and shows why the
right to abortion should nonetheless be protected. Most court
decisions and commentary have incorrectly assumed that fetal or
embryonic personhood would completely defeat the right to
abortion.91
88

See MCDONAGH, at 171-73.
Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Opinion Concurring in the Judgment Except as to Doe, in
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 119 (“As there are privileges of
citizenship, so too there are duties, such as jury or military service. ... But we do
not deal here with such public duties of citizenship. Rather, we deal with a law that
would force a particular private life on particular private individuals....”).
90
See MCDONAGH, at 145, 171-73
91
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (“If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.”); Abele v.
Markle, 341 F.Supp. 224, 228-29 (D. Conn. 1972) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine how
a statute permitting abortion could be constitutional if the fetus had fourteenth
amendment rights.”); but see id. at 228 (“If [the fetus] is [a person], then a
legislature may well have some discretion to protect that right even at the expense
of someone else's constitutional right.”) (emphasis added). See also Balkin,
Original Meaning, at 339-40 and n. 127 (arguing that fetal personhood would
imply that abortion could never be legal, except—after a hearing with appointed
counsel for the fetus— to protect a pregnant woman from death or serious injury).
Disagreement over whether fetal personhood completely defeats the right to
abortion appears to reflect deep-seated assumptions about whether pregnancy is a

89
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Despite these strengths, the Good Samaritan argument has not
taken hold in either court decisions or popular discourse about
abortion. This failure is due to three related layers of resistance to
Thomson’s analogy.
First is the entrenched naturalness of pregnancy and other
caretaking as women’s social role. It is opponents, not advocates, of
abortion who paint the right as a right to walk away from rendering
life-saving aid to another. Legal doctrine reflects cultural
assumptions when it refuses to see that abortion regulations are sexspecific.92 In the absence of an impossibly precise analogy,
background assumptions about the naturalness of female care work
fill the gap of rationalizing a duty to carry a fetus to term.
Second, an important strand of feminist thought resists the law’s
embrace of Bad Samaritanism generally. Most feminists would
object to a legal system that forces women but not men to provide
care. Relational feminists, however, disagree with the Bad Samaritan
principle that it is generally inappropriate for the law to demand
caretaking.93 One feminist criticism of the Good Samaritan
argument, then, is that it depends on embrace of the Bad Samaritan
principle. It seems odd to ground a fundamental basis for women’s
equality in a principle that is rejected by an important branch of
feminism.94

passive or active state—i.e., whether making a baby rather than aborting is an act
or an omission.
92
Under the logic of Geduldig, abortion laws are sex-neutral because they apply to
anyone, regardless of sex, who is pregnant and seeks an abortion. See Geduldig v.
Aillieo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). While Geduldig’s future is uncertain, see Reva B.
Siegel, You’ve Come A Long Way Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1873 (2006) (arguing that Nev.
Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), “introduces an important new
understanding of” Geduldig); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1322 (“In the pregnancy
area, the notion that one must first be the same as a comparator before being
entitled to equal treatment has been deeply undermined, although it remains
constitutional precedent.”), the problem remains that there is no precise, realistic
analog to pregnancy in male experience.
93
See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 575, 580-81 (1993) (using relational feminist concepts to argue
against the Bad Samaritan principle that a person has no duty to rescue a stranger
in distress).
94
In a similar vein, Sylvia Law has objected that the Good Samaritan argument
suggests that abortion is morally wrong even if legally defensible. See Law,
Rethinking, at 1022. Thomson suggests the possibility that the law must refrain
from requiring individuals to be Good Samaritans but might still require them to be
Minimally Decent Samaritans. See Thomson, A Defense, at 63-64.
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Third, the violinist analogy lacks resonance with women’s
experiences of pregnancy, reproduction, and abortion. The physical
burden of normal pregnancy is not what prompts most abortions.95
Most women who want to have a child are willing to undergo
pregnancy if they can; many women take great medical risks to bear
children. In extreme cases this risk-taking probably reflects
undesirable social conditioning toward a maternal imperative. But in
recognizing the problem of the extreme we should not condemn the
more typical case, in which reasonably healthy women willingly
assume the medical risks of pregnancy.96 The Good Samaritan
argument is thus unable to provide a convincing account of abortion
rights as human rights for women, even if the argument ought to be
doctrinally sufficient to call into question the constitutionality of
abortion bans.
The body-focused arguments—from the health exception to the
Bad Samaritan principle—illustrate both the need for and the limits
of equality arguments. The health exception has been carefully
constructed as distinct from early elective abortion, maintaining the
normalcy of pregnancy’s inherent risks. Women’s right to bodily
integrity is thus defined narrowly even as the doctrine purports to
protect it. The Good Samaritan argument steps in to reveal the extent
of the burden thereby placed on women. In doing so, however, the
Good Samaritan argument characterizes pregnancy and abortion in
ways designed to maximize their similarity to men’s lives rather than
their place in women’s lives. What makes both the health exception
and the Good Samaritan argument incomplete is that the right to
have an abortion is not just about bodily integrity and medical selfdefense. It is about the entire course of one’s life. Because of this
omission, and perhaps because of the persistence of an idealized
image of pregnancy, arguments that focus on the whole life’s course
95

In a study published in 2005 examining the reasons that contributed to a
woman’s choice to obtain an abortion, 74% of the respondents stated that “having
a baby would dramatically change my life,” 73% of the respondents said that they
couldn’t afford a baby, and 48% of the respondents didn’t “want to be a single
mother or [were] having relationship problems.” Lawrence B. Finer, Lori F.
Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M. Moore, Reasons U.S.
Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112 (2005).
96
The alternatives are either a dramatic reduction in population or a much more
widespread market in babies, in which poor women bear all the risks of pregnancy
and the sale of children through surrogacy contracts is normalized as a convenient
and more rational way for a wealthy woman to have a child, rather than a last
resort in the face of infertility.
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rather than the nine months of pregnancy have become more
prevalent in feminist thought, public discourse, and the Supreme
Court’s own explanations for the abortion right.
B. THE BURDENS OF MOTHERHOOD: AN INCOMPLETE
ACCOUNT OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Rather than comparing pregnancy to other physical invasions,
burdens-of-motherhood arguments compare the social burdens of
motherhood to the social burdens of fatherhood. This emphasis
responds to the reality that the importance of abortion rights is not
limited to the period of pregnancy. At the same time, however, the
comparison distances abortion rights from the physical fact of
pregnancy.
Burdens-of-motherhood arguments have evolved over the years.
They began in a relatively simple form that had its roots in the
formal equality theory of second-wave legal feminism.97 Formal
equality theory sees a path to equality in being like a man, in
particular being free of caretaking responsibility for children. It at
times reflects an implicit assumption that having children is
incompatible with a woman’s professional advancement. Thus,
equality in the public sphere depends on a right to abortion in
private.
More nuanced incarnations of this approach reject the
assumption that children are inherently a hindrance to women’s
equality in the public sphere. They blame socially enforced gender
roles for pressuring women to sacrifice participation in the public
sphere for the sake of caretaking. These arguments also contextualize
the abortion right in women’s lived experiences of intersecting
inequalities. In doing so, however, they detach the abortion right
from women’s bodies and suggest that the right is contingent on the
persistence of those inequalities. This form of equality argument is
thus important for illuminating the operation of sex inequality in
society, but it is incomplete as an account of reproductive freedom as
a human right.
1.

Version One: Women in a Man’s World

In the years after Roe, as abortion gained increasing political
salience, the felt connection between abortion rights and sex equality
97

See Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 57 (2002)
(“By the time the second wave of the feminist movement reached the legal system,
it was dominated by formal equality, a commitment to the equal treatment of
individual men and women regardless of sex.”).
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began to permeate legal discourse about abortion. In 1992, in Casey,
the Supreme Court briefly recognized this connection in affirming
what it called the “essential holding” of Roe.98
The Court’s acknowledgement of equality concerns overlapped
with its discussion of stare decisis. Casey argued that women had
come to rely on the availability of abortion in planning their lives,
particularly with respect to pursuing educational and other
opportunities leading to greater participation in the public sphere:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their places
in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives. …
An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s
concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society, and to make reproductive decisions ....99
Casey also suggested that state prohibition of abortion might have
more to do with controlling women than with protecting fetuses.100
To the extent that these brief references can be read as an
equality argument for abortion rights,101 the argument assumes
incompatibility between motherhood and full participation in the
public sphere. The Court cited correlations among women’s
increased education, increased workforce participation, and reduced
fertility, but it ignored the complexity of the relationships among
those aspects of women’s lives and the importance of social policy in
constraining the choices that women and mothers have. By taking the
social structure as given, Casey’s vision of equality accepted the
division of the world into separate spheres and merely gave women
the option of being like men. It was an argument on behalf of the
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 856, 860.
100
Id. at 852 (“Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of women’s role, however dominant that vision
has been in the course of our history and culture.”).
101
See Daly, Reconsidering (arguing that Casey represented a shift from privacy
toward equality).

99
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atypical woman who seeks to pursue a male path, rather than a
challenge to the gendered hierarchy itself.102
Casey’s version of the equality argument is also class-specific,
and even for well-off women it offers a false promise of equality.
The women Casey envisioned were facing unwanted pregnancies as
obstacles to college and more, not struggling to make ends meet on
minimum wage or to care for the children they already had. They
needed abortions because they had other opportunities to pursue.103
Moreover, the men to whom they were implicitly compared are not
without children, nor are their children all planned; women and men
experience unplanned parenthood at the same rate. The difference is
that, for the most part, the men have wives or other women who care
for those children. There is thus some merit to the pro-life rejoinder
that Casey’s version of equality promises women that they can be
equal to men so long as they are willing to “slay their children in
order to obtain equal access to the marketplace and the public
square.”104 Women, but not men, must forgo or delay parenthood in
order to succeed in the public sphere. Casey’s vision of abortion as a
tool for equality questions neither the division of labor that makes
motherhood but not fatherhood inconsistent with career success nor
the structure of a public sphere that is hostile to caretaking demands.
Outside the courts, most feminists have long rejected any such
acceptance of separate spheres or of a public sphere designed to be
hostile to dependency.
Of course, the public sphere nonetheless persists in its current
form, only somewhat less hostile to dependency than it was in 1973

102

In that respect, Casey is consistent with the Court’s sex discrimination
jurisprudence generally. See Law, Rethinking, at 981-82 (arguing that ACLU
litigation strategy in sex cases perpetuated the disregard of difference).
The seeds of Casey’s equality approach can be found in Roe itself, which
similarly presented “decisions about motherhood as a private dilemma to be
resolved by the woman and her doctor: a ‘woman’s problem,’ in which the social
organization of motherhood plays little part.” Siegel, Reasoning, at 273. This
account “invites criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of feminine
expedience … because it presents the burdens of motherhood as women’s destiny
and dilemma—a condition for which no other social actor bears responsibility.”
Id.,at 274.
103
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (citing data pertaining to fertility and college
education).
104
Teresa Stanton Collett, Dissenting Opinion, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID, at 194.
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or 1992, and the private sphere remains neglected by men.105 Casey
was thus factually correct that the availability of abortion is an
important factor in women’s ability to pursue public careers. A
broader vision of reproductive freedom, however, demands an
abortion right that does not depend on structural sex inequality. Even
in a perfect society, not every pregnancy will be planned. Moreover,
there is a difference between unplanned and unwanted; there ought
to be room for unplanned pregnancies to become wanted pregnancies
without derailing the rest of life. Casey’s vision of women
assimilating into a man’s world free of caretaking burdens does not
allow for that space.
2.

Version Two: Women in a Sexist World

The more nuanced version of this argument is exemplified by
Jack Balkin’s recent Abortion and Original Meaning.106 Balkin
attributes the incompatibility between motherhood and public
participation to social pressure to conform to a particular vision of
motherhood.107 He compares the burdens of motherhood to the
burdens of fatherhood and finds socially imposed disparities.108 This
comparison highlights the fact that the problem lies in society rather
than biology. The comparison, however, suffers from its rejection of
biology as one source of the problem. Defending abortion as a
remedy for social inequality overlooks the fundamental nature of
women’s need to control their reproductive lives, implies inherent
limits on the right, and abstracts women’s bodies out of the
discussion. It is an apology, rather than a moral justification, for
abortion.
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See Karen Czapansky, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Equity, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1415-16, 1435 (1991) (collecting statistics on
men’s continuing non-participation in domestic work).
106
Balkin, Original Meaning. See also Siegel, Reasoning; MacKinnon,
Reflections, at 1312-13 (“Social custom, pressure, exclusion from well-paying
jobs, the structure of the marketplace, and lack of adequate daycare have exploited
women's commitment to and caring for children and relegated women to this
pursuit which is not even considered an occupation but an expression of the X
chromosome.”); Colker, Equality Theory (critiquing several versions of the
equality argument for abortion rights from an anti-essentialist perspective); Colker,
An Equal Protection Analysis (arguing that society, rather than biology, puts the
burdens of parenthood on women and that abortion restrictions should be attacked
for their disparate impact on women, under a more stringent disparate impact
standard than the one set out in Feeney).
107
See Balkin, Original Meaning, at 324.
108
See id. at 323-24.
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First, attributing the burdens of motherhood to societal
discrimination ignores many women’s experience of caretaking as an
authentic choice. Casey appeared merely to assume that whenever a
child was born that burden would fall on the mother. The more
sophisticated versions of the argument agree but explain that
phenomenon in terms of social pressure to conform to gender roles.
This explanation requires too much false consciousness about the
reasons mothers devote huge amounts of time, money, and energy to
caring for their children. Without denying the social pressure on
mothers, it is, first, a good thing that someone feels that level of
responsibility towards children. Second, it is not unreasonable to
think that even in our non-sexist future, women will feel
disproportionately attached (relative to men) to their biological
children, at least at the time of birth.109 The ability to act on that
attachment without sacrificing material security or public life is as
much a part of reproductive freedom as the right to abortion.
Setting aside questions of causation—whether state action,
societal discrimination, or authentic choice explains more of the
disproportionate burdens of motherhood—why is abortion an
appropriate remedy for women’s poverty and other inequality?
Catharine MacKinnon argues, “Short of … equality … abortion has
offered the only way out.”110 But it is a very narrow way. Everyone
agrees, in theory, that if a woman wants to have a child but fears she
cannot afford to care for it, alleviating her poverty would be
preferable to merely pointing her to an abortion clinic.111 Pro-choice
advocates are quick to point out that they, rather than their pro-life
opponents, are more likely to support sex education, freely available
contraception, health care, social welfare programs, and a familyfriendly public sphere.112 Accusing one’s opponent of hypocrisy,
109

See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 473-82 (discussing surrogacy and
reproductive technology). My claim is not that the bond between a biological
mother and child is unequaled by other love between parents and children (or that
the bond is always one of love) but that pregnancy is sufficient to create a
cognizable parent-child relationship that will typically include emotional bonds).
110
MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1317.
111
Cf. West, Opinion Concurrin gin the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 141 (“If there is a conflict between caring for one’s
children and being a citizen in this Republic of choice, it is a conflict that will also
burden mothers who enjoyed fully consensual, welcome pregnancies conceived in
happy, consensual, joyful sex.”).
112
See, e.g., Colker, Equality Theory, at 107 (“Why are the states that refuse to
increase funding for women and children under Medicaid also the states that
restrict abortion substantially?”); Pollitt, supra (“So far as I can tell, [Feminists for
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however, is not a response to the merits of her argument.113 The fact
that abortion opponents have not offered better solutions to women’s
poverty does not alter the grossness of the disparity between the
problem and abortion as a remedy. Focusing on the inequalities that
constrain women’s lives can explain why the right to abortion is
sometimes an important means of asserting some control over a
woman’s own life. But using abortion as a backstop to avoid the
worst impositions of inequality does not provide a full justification of
abortion as a human right regardless of the woman’s social
condition.
The emphasis on existing social inequality also suggests a builtin sunset clause for abortion rights. If the right to abortion flows
from society’s disproportionate expectations of mothers, then
abortion rights will no longer be needed once the Supreme Court
Life] is the only ‘prolife’ organization that talks about women’s rights to work and
education and the need to make both more compatible with motherhood.”).
113
Consider this comparison. In Carhart II, the Supreme Court accepted a
paternalistic, woman-protective rationale for banning what Congress deemed
“partial-birth” abortions. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
One of the Court’s reasons for protecting women from a particular abortion
procedure was the supposition that women were not aware of how the procedure
was performed. Banning the procedure protected a woman from trauma later on,
when she learned “that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the
fast-developing brain of her unborn child.” Id. at 160. While much of this
reasoning was directed at the abortion decision itself, the opinion suggests that
doctors were likely performing abortions without fully apprising women of what
the procedure entails and offering a choice of method. Perhaps ordinary standards
of informed consent were inadequate where the choice of procedure is reasonably
understood to have moral as well as medical implications.
The government’s and the Court’s response to this problem understandably
infuriated feminists. In dissent, Justice Ginsburgh fulminated at the paternalism of
responding to the absence of adequately informed consent by removing choice
rather than providing information. See id. at 183-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Suppose, however, that rather than banning a particular procedure, Congress had
imposed a heightened informed consent requirement. To ensure full consent to the
abortion method, women were subjected to descriptions of abortion procedures like
those found in the Carhart opinions. Feminists would surely object. They might
propose a different solution, or argue that no change is needed. The feminist
objection, however, would not mean that feminist outrage at the paternalism in the
Court’s reasoning is any less justified. The Court’s argument is demeaning to
women regardless of whether feminists have an alternative solution that the
sponsors of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act would also find acceptable.
The same is true for the question of abortion as a response to poverty or other
systematic inequality suffered by women who might seek abortions. The
availability of abortion is a “pathetically inadequate remedy” for a pregnant woman
who lacks the material resources to rear a child. Robin West, Opinion Concurring
in the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 141.
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concludes that sex equality is at hand. Many women in the U.S.
already experience greater levels of equality and privilege than any
other women in recorded history. The Supreme Court has already
forecasted the end of structural race inequality within a generation;
the practical end of sex inequality cannot be far behind.114
Equality, of course, can be achieved by leveling up or by
leveling down. A state could claim that women no longer “need”
abortion either by improving women’s ability to control their
sexuality and by supporting pregnancy and child-rearing (leveling
up) or by imposing substantial sex- and child-related burdens on men
(leveling down). In either case, the burdens-of-motherhood
arguments suggest that greater infringement on women’s liberty
would be justified. Indeed, some of the strongest advocates of
women’s equality have suggested that greater restrictions on abortion
would be warranted under conditions of sex equality.115
An increasing number of liberal voices are also rising in support
of the one kind of restriction on abortion that the Supreme Court has
consistently struck down: spousal notification and consent
requirements. Commentators who implicitly assume at least rough
social equality between men and women are now beginning to see a
biological and legal inequality in women’s favor. Men, in this view,
are unfairly disadvantaged by their lack of control over pregnancy
and the decision whether to abort. Proponents of this view have
proposed remedies ranging from a due process-like right to notice of
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See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 342-43 (2003) (predicting that affirmative
action in higher education will not be needed after about twenty-five years).
115
See, e.g., Siegel, Reasoning, at 366-67 (stating that a state could justify forced
pregnancy “by showing that the state does all in its power to promote the welfare
of unborn life by noncoercive means …; by demonstrating that the sacrifices the
state exacts of women on behalf of the unborn are in fact commensurate with those
it exacts of men …; and even, by showing that the state is ready to compensate
women for the impositions and opportunity costs of bearing a child they do not
wish to raise”); MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1326-27 (“Under conditions of sex
equality, I would personally be more interested in taking the man's view into
account”); but see id. (“The issue of the pregnant woman's nine-month
commitment and risk would remain, and might have to be dispositive. The privacy
approach might make more sense.”). Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Prospective
Abolition of Abortion: Abortion and the Constitution in 2047, 1 UNIV. OF ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (proposing a constitutional amendment banning
abortion to take effect in forty years, although not conditioning this effect on any
improvements in women’s status).
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the pregnancy and an opportunity to be heard, to relieving men from
child support obligations if they would have preferred an abortion.116
If pregnancy and women’s liberty were adequately theorized,
the prospect of more state control of abortion once equal liberty is
declared would easily be recognized as a contradiction in terms.117
The need for abortions would almost certainly decrease dramatically
under conditions of sex equality, but the same cannot be said of the
need for abortion rights.118
Moreover, the combination of (1) poverty and inequality as a
justification for abortion and (2) willingness to allow greater
regulation when and where women enjoy greater equality is a
potentially dangerous mix. Demographic panic in the United States
and Europe today is reminiscent of the fears that motivated the
criminalization of abortion in the first place. Conservatives have
increasingly expressed concern that privileged women are failing to
breed, while less privileged women are breeding too much.119 A
116

See Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure (draft on file) (seeking a kind of
equality by proposing that men should have to compensate women for the pain and
suffering of pregnancy but that in exchange women should be required to notify
and consult with biological fathers with regard to decisions about the pregnancy);
Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose: Men deserve a voice in the abortion
decision, 28 LEGAL TIMES 1 (Apr. 4, 2005) (arguing that a man who is not
negligent with respect to conception should be able to avoid a child support
obligation by requesting that the woman abort); cf. Czapansky, Volunteers and
Draftees, at 1478-79 (arguing that mother should be required to notify father of
birth, with judicial bypass available).
117
See Allen, The Fix, at 432 (“[I]f constitutional liberty does not include
reproductive control, then a national citizenship … continues to mean something
disturbingly different for male and female citizens.”); Hanigsberg, Homologizing,
at 413 (“Would any of these suggestions [for supporting women] obviate the need
for abortions? The answer is no. In countries with a social welfare net beyond the
wildest dreams of Americans, women still need abortion as a way to manage their
procreative lives.”); Colker, Equality Theory, at 109 (“And if legislatures regulated
men’s lives more, would that make restrictions on women constitutional or not
sex-based?”); see also Rubenfeld, Concurring, at 119 (distinguishing cases such as
jury or military service because “we do not deal here with such public duties of
citizenship. Rather, we deal with a law that would force a particular private life on
particular private individuals.”).
118
President Obama’s efforts to bridge the divide in the abortion debate show the
importance of maintaining the distinction between reducing the need for abortions
and reducing the number of abortions by any available means. See generally Jon
O’Brien, Reducing the Need for Abortion: Honest Effort or Ideological Dodge,
CONSCIENCE: THE NEWSJOURNAL OF CATHOLIC OPINION (published by Catholics
for Choice), at 13 (Summer 2009).
119
See GOLDBERG, MEANS OF REPRODUCTION, at 198-222 (discussing the “threat
of first-world population decline that has, in recent years, come to obsess
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theory that emphasizes social disadvantage as the primary
justification for abortion, and allows for greater regulation when
greater sex equality is present, is an invitation to regulate access to
abortion in an essentially eugenic fashion. It is not hard to imagine,
for example, that abortion decisions could be made by a
governmental body under a generous “health” standard that permits
or encourages abortion for poor women but rejects abortion requests
from women with ample means to support a child. In other words, a
sunset clause for reproductive rights is a bad idea in any event; even
worse if the sunset looks different on the basis of race and class.
Finally, disconnecting abortion rights from the body has
implications for other doctrinal developments in the realm of privacy
and reproductive rights. The focus on the social aspect of
motherhood, rather than the biological, lends support to a generalized
“right to avoid parenthood,” a right about which feminists should be
cautious.120 To date, this right has been applied to enforce the wishes
of a husband seeking to destroy frozen embryos over his wife’s
protest.121 It also lends credibility to claims for a so-called “male
right to abortion,” the claimed right to avoid child support
obligations to an unintended child.122 When the right to abortion is
premised largely on the post-birth consequences of motherhood, it is
not entirely unreasonable to argue that it is unfair for women to have
a clean-up period to avoid motherhood after pregnancy has begun,
while sexual intercourse for men is a strict liability affair.123 Resting
the right to abortion entirely on the social context of parenthood is an
invitation to claims of equal rights for men.
Burdens-of-motherhood arguments respond to the lived
experiences of pregnancy and inequality that structure the
circumstances under which many women seek abortions. By
focusing on the social burden of motherhood as compared to
fatherhood, however, they disconnect the abortion right from
women’s bodies, instead constructing it as a right to avoid
parenthood under conditions of inequality. This account of abortion
rights is revealing and powerful in many circumstances, but it is
conservatives worldwide”); see also The Economist, Special Issue on Aging
(2009).
120
See generally I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1115 (2008) (proposing a framework for distinguishing claims about the
right not to be a gestational, genetic, or legal parent).
121
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
122
See Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose; district court decision in South Dakota.
123
That is, not unreasonable as long as one ignores the existence of the child.
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insufficient for a construction of women’s reproductive human rights
that looks forward to the elimination of that inequality.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF
PREGNANCY
No one wants an abortion as she wants an ice-cream cone
or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught
in a trap, wants to gnaw off its own leg.
—Frederica Mathewes-Green124
Body-focused and burden-focused arguments for abortion rights
both seek comparisons by emphasizing one aspect of pregnancy. The
limits of both kinds of comparisons stem from the separation of the
biological and social aspects of pregnancy. Body-focused
comparisons highlight bodily integrity at the expense of the social
context that is crucial in the decision to seek an abortion. Burdens-ofmotherhood comparisons emphasize that social context and the lifechanging burdens that motherhood entails. Yet, in order to make
those burdens support an equality argument, they attribute women’s
parenting decisions to negative forces in society. Moreover, severing
the “right to avoid parenthood” from women’s bodies has
undesirable implications. A better basis for equality arguments
would respect pregnancy as a unitary process even while trying to
draw analogies to other experiences.
Such an approach is well grounded in existing precedent dealing
with pregnancy outside the context of abortion. The Supreme Court
has already treated pregnancy, in its biological and social aspects, as
the foundation for constitutionally protected parental rights. Its
approach has been criticized for essentializing women as mothers,
and thus perhaps undermining the right to abortion. It holds the
potential, however, for a more robust theory of reproductive rights
that connects abortion to other concerns rather than isolating it.
A pregnant woman has a right to abortion for the same reason
she is the presumptive constitutional parent of any baby she carries
to term: because pregnancy is physical caretaking and the archetype
for creating a parental relationship. This unified understanding of
pregnancy is a better basis for articulating women’s rights because it
treats the female rather than the male experience as the norm.
124

Frederica Mathewes-Green, Seeking Abortion’s Middle Ground: Why My ProLife Allies Should Revise Their Self-Defeating Rhetoric, WASH. POST., July 28,
1996, at C1.
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A. PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD
The harm of forced pregnancy should be understood in toto, as
hijacking the body to force the creation of an intimate caretaking
relationship. While the abortion right has been described in this way,
the impulse to break it down into separate pieces remains because of
the need to find male analogs for equality arguments. That process of
disaggregation, however, takes us further away from an
understanding of human dignity that is at home in female bodies.
“Bearing a child creates a profoundly intimate relationship between
the woman and the child, even when that relationship ends shortly
after birth.”125 Forced pregnancy forces women into that intimate
relationship regardless of whether society imposes too many
expectations and disabilities on maternal status.
Abortion rights are not the only context in which pregnancy is
relevant to constitutional analysis. In an important line of cases
dealing with the parental rights of unwed fathers, the Supreme Court
used pregnancy as the model for defining constitutional status as a
parent. The Court recognized that pregnancy combines biology and
caretaking, and it based its equal protection analysis on a female
baseline. The unwed father decisions thus provide a starting point for
constitutional analysis of reproduction that defines rights with
women’s unique experiences as the norm rather than the
exception.126
The unwed father cases involved a series of challenges to state
laws that treated the mother but not the father as the legal parent of a
child born outside of marriage.127 The Supreme Court started with
the assumption that the biological mother’s parental rights were
established by the birth of the child. The Court also accepted the
state’s argument that biological fathers were not similarly situated to
biological mothers: biological maternity implied a caretaking
relationship to the child, which is not part of biological paternity.128
Men were thus at a biological disadvantage when it came to parental
rights.129 By analogy to cases such as Geduldig, where women were
125

Law, Rethinking, at 1018.
For a more detailed elaboration of this point, see Hendricks, Essentially a
Mother, at 433-444.
127
The main cases are Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); and
Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
128
See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 435-36.
129
Men are disadvantaged in that they are unable to become pregnant and give
birth to a child. Cf. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and
126
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biologically disadvantaged in the workplace, the conclusion should
have been that the state could choose whether to accommodate men’s
disadvantage by giving them parental rights.
The Court, however, did not end its analysis with the
observation that women and men are not similarly situated and
therefore need not be treated the same. Instead, having identified a
relevant biological difference between the sexes, the Court took
another step: it used motherhood as the model for crafting a
“biology-plus-relationship” test to accommodate fathers’ physical
disadvantage. As the Court later explained, it makes sense to allow a
man to acquire parental rights comparable to a mother’s by creating a
test “in terms the male can fulfill.”130 Men’s biological disadvantage
thus served not as a justification for different legal treatment but as
the impetus for devising a legal standard that fairly accommodated
their disadvantage. “[P]arental rights, the one area of law in which
men’s biology rather than women’s is a disadvantage, is also the one
area in which the Supreme Court has adopted a flexible,
accommodating theory of sex equality” as a matter of constitutional
command, not just governmental choice.131
This vision of pregnancy as combining a biological relationship
with a caretaking relationship fits comfortably at the intersection of
the body-focused and burdens-of-motherhood arguments for abortion
rights. Pregnancy itself, when unwanted, is both a bodily invasion
and a social relationship of caretaking. It is precisely that
combination that is at the heart of the harm of forced pregnancy, yet
the combination is too often abandoned in the quest for a comparison
to male experience. A better comparison would retain both elements,
since it is the combination of biology and social relationship that
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 297, 303 (1990) (noting the “disadvantage [that] men experience in accessing
child-nurturing opportunities”).
130
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (describing Congress’s effort to give
male citizens means to obtain citizenship for foreign-born children). See also Mary
L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender
Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 88-90
(1995) (stating that the model parent is a pregnant woman but that the “different
biological roles of men and women in human reproduction make it imperative that
law and public policy ‘recognize that a father and a mother must be permitted to
demonstrate commitment to their child in different ways’”) (quoting Recent
Developments: Family Law—Unwed Fathers’ Rights—New York Court of Appeals
Mandates Veto Power Over Newborn’s Adoption for Unwed Father Who
Demonstrates Parental Responsibility, 104 HARV. L. REV. 800, 807 (1991).
131
Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 444.
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makes pregnancy uniquely challenging to analyze using legal
principles based on the experiences of “non-pregnant persons.”132
B. PREGNANCY AS PARENTING: A DANGEROUS PATH?
The biology-plus-relationship understanding of pregnancy unites
the bodily and social aspects of motherhood in a woman-centered
definition of parenthood. That model of parenthood is well-suited to
describe the harm of forced pregnancy. Nonetheless, there is cause to
be concerned about the implications for abortion rights of describing
pregnancy as a form of parental relationship. Opponents of
reproductive rights use a similar conception of pregnancy to suggest
that the natural order of biology implies a woman’s duty to bear
children.133 That implication, however, depends on transforming an
ability into a duty. Properly understood, the biological caretaking
model of pregnancy supports the right to abortion as part of a
comprehensive theory of reproductive freedom.
1.

Abortion and Mothering

The description of pregnancy as a caretaking, parental
relationship sounds alarm bells for many feminists. The capacity for
pregnancy has long been the basis for extrapolating general duties of
uncompensated care work by women, as well as condemnation of
women who seek abortions. Both liberals and conservatives on the
Supreme Court have at times reacted to that concern by going to the
opposite extreme, denying that pregnancy has relational
significance.134 Commentators have warned of the dangers of
relational feminist theories that emphasize women’s connectedness
to others.135 Feminist theory that portrays women as inherently more
132

Geduldig v. Aillieo, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974). More accurately, it is the
experiences not only of the currently non-pregnant but of those who will never be
pregnant and whose social identity is not defined largely by the possibility,
regardless of the probability, of pregnancy. See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that employer violated Title VII when
it barred all fertile women from a job that involved exposure to lead).
133
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 265-80 (discussing the “physiological” reasoning
behind the criminalization of abortion).
134
See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 468-71 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
recent insistence on the maternal-paternal equivalence at the moment of birth);
ROTHMAN, at 248-49 (“[B]oth patriarchal ideology and liberal feminist thinking
have come to the same conclusion about what to do with the problem of the
uniqueness of pregnancy: devalue it. … Instead of a flower pot, the woman is seen
as an equal contributor of seed—and the baby might just as well have grown in the
backyard.”).
135
See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
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nurturing than men can easily be used against feminist political
goals.
The model of pregnancy I have described is not based on the
tenets of relational feminism. Relational feminists are correct,
however, that pregnancy and birth are occasions of heightened
connection to another life. While the capacity for pregnancy does not
imply that women have a nurturing essence, pregnancy is an act of
nurturance: the feeding and care of a developing life. That nurturing
may be done with love, indifference, or hate, but it is done, and is
thus analogous to the relationship prong of the biology-plusrelationship test for unwed fathers.136
The unwed father cases recognized that a history of nurturing
gives rise to an emotional bond that is both worthy of respect and
indicative of future willingness to provide care. This result is at least
as plausible as a consequence of pregnancy. Specifically, it is
plausible that pregnancy and childbirth will induce a woman to
respond to the child in ways that make her likely to be a better
caretaker and decision-maker than a person who lacks such a bond
with the child.
Of course, just because such a bond might seem natural does not
necessarily mean it should have legal significance. “Nature,” after
all, “is what we were put on this earth to rise above.”137 Much of our
legal and social structure is devoted to suppressing what appear to be
natural impulses. The thrust of equal protection jurisprudence has
been to reject legal rules premised on claims about natural sex
differences.138 The point of the comparison to the unwed father

858 (1993); see also Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 380, 410 (noting that concerns
about the implications of acknowledging a maternal relationship with the fetus
have constrained feminist discourse about abortion). In law, relational feminism is
typically a critique of autonomy-oriented, rights-centered discourse that ignores or
discounts relationships and dependency. That critique is described as feminist on
the basis of a series of claims about sex differences. Women are said to feel more
connected to other people and to be more sensitive to relationships, as compared to
men.
136
Cf. Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 385 (“The argument that pregnancy is unique,
however, should neither devalue nor sentimentalize it.”).
137
Rose Sayer (Katherine Hepburn) to Charlie Allnut (Humphrey Bogart) in The
African Queen (United Artists 1951). See generally Brian Leiter & Michael
Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology is (So Far) Irrelevant to Legal Regulation, _
L. & PHIL. _ (forthcoming).
138
See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546-556 (1986) (rejecting a plan to
admit only men to a traditional military academy and only women to a “leadership
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cases, however, is not that women are any more inherently nurturing
than men are. The unwed father cases reflect a social judgment that it
is normatively good to recognize and promote a bond based on
biological connection and a history of caretaking. Recognition of a
similar bond created by pregnancy does not imply that pregnancy has
unique status as the ultimate form of caregiving or that only pregnant
and birthing women can achieve such a bond with a child.139 Rather,
pregnancy is a form of caretaking that is at least comparable to the
relationships recognized in the unwed father cases, relationships that
routinely form between children and their caretakers beyond their
birth mothers.140 Fear of traditional ideology—or the excesses of
relational feminism—should not lead to discounting pregnancy,
especially as compared to other forms of parental relationships.141
2.

Abortion Decisions as Parental Decisions

The relationship model of pregnancy needs to be incorporated
into the feminist discourse on abortion. Most arguments for abortion
rights emphasize the weight of the woman’s interest. Only the Good
Samaritan arguments directly address the implications of fetal life.
This Article assumes that a vigorous defense of abortion rights can
still value fetal life, as many pregnant women do. There is much to
be gained from recognizing the moral status of pregnancy as a
parental relationship. Abortion is always a decision about
parenthood, but sometimes it is also a parenting decision. The
comparative rights discourse about abortion too often leaves
feminists without a framework for talking about abortion as part of
parenting. Abortion rights are better understood by connecting them
to parenting.142

academy” designed for what the state claimed were women’s typical educational
needs).
139
See ROTHMAN, at 242 (“[The relationship theory of pregnancy] does not mean
that the maternal relationship cannot be ended. Nor does it mean that the
relationship is the most overwhelming, all-powerful relationship on earth.”).
140
See Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 473-75; see also Law, Rethinking, at
1007 (arguing that refusal to acknowledge the special relationship of pregnancy
means that women can only be equal to the extent they are the same as men).
141
Cf. MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1305 (“The dissent [in Michael M v. Superior
Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the statutory rape case,] revealed more concern with
avoiding the stereotyping attendant to the ideological message the law
communicated than with changing the facts that make the stereotype largely
true.”); Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, at 470-71 (criticizing opinions in Nguyen
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), for denying reality for the sake of superficial formal
equality).
142
See Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 390.
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That the abortion decision can be a parenting decision is most
readily apparent in the context of the ban on intact D&E abortions.
The Supreme Court struck down Nebraska’s ban in Stenberg v.
Carhart (Carhart I).143 In addition to vagueness problems, the statute
was unconstitutional because it had no health exception, even though
“a substantial body of medical opinion” held that intact D&E was
sometimes safer.144 Seven years later, however, the Court handed
down Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II),145 discussed earlier in this
Article. Justice O’Connor having been replaced with Justice Alito,
the Court in Carhart II upheld the federal ban with no health
exception.
An unacknowledged tragedy of Carhart II was that many of the
abortions to which the law applies are abortions of wanted
pregnancies. The “partial birth” procedure was used only in
relatively late abortions. In some cases, these would be pre-viability
abortions sought primarily because lack of health services delayed a
woman’s knowledge of her pregnancy or access to abortion. In other
pre-viability cases, and in all post-viability cases, the abortion is
triggered by fetal deformities or by a threat to the pregnant woman’s
life or health.146 The patient receiving a “partial birth” abortion may
be a woman who has already picked out names, arranged for
maternity leave, or had a baby shower. She has suddenly been faced
with the prospect of her own possible death or disability, or of giving
birth to a child who would know little but suffering in its short life.
A woman planning an abortion in such circumstances faces
additional decisions regarding the method of abortion. In some cases,
the doctor can induce contractions, performing an abortion by
triggering a miscarriage. Of the surgical options, the traditional D&E
is legal, while the intact D&E is now illegal. There is no clear
medical distinction between the two procedures, and the legal
distinction is based primarily on Congress and the Supreme Court’s
purported disgust for intact D&E.
While medical exigencies may favor one method of abortion
over others, they are not the only relevant factors. Many women may
prefer an abortion by induction, tracking to some degree the birth
143

530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Id. at 937-38.
145
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
146
See id. at 173 n. 3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the reasons that women
seek abortions in the second trimester); MAUREEN PAUL, ET AL., A CLINICIAN’S
GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 17-18 (1999).
144
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they had been anticipating, albeit with a tragic end. This procedure,
when medically possible, may allow the woman to see and hold the
intact fetus. Other women may want to avoid the resemblance to
birth. The intact D&E avoids the physical and emotional toll of
prolonged labor while also preserving the fetus intact.147 Women
may also come to different conclusions than Congress about the
relative morality of regular and intact D&E.148
The sympathy evoked by this example need not be reserved for
women reluctantly aborting welcomed pregnancies because of
complications. A woman who needs a second trimester abortion
because poverty or youth delayed her action is entitled to the same
presumption that she is capable of making her own moral choice.
The very factors that delayed her decision may also be the ones that
make the abortion necessary. Her decision is no less parental, and her
moral reasoning no less able to account for fetal life, because she had
not meant to become a parent.149
In Carhart II, the Court accepted Congress’s characterization of
the intact D&E on the grounds that it “perverts” the natural birth
process.150 Yet the Act’s proponents pointed to induction of labor as
the morally superior method for necessary late abortions.151
Apparently, the “natural birth process” is not when a woman labors
to push out a baby but when a doctor uses instruments to extract a
fetus from a uterus.152
147

See PAUL, CLINICIAN’S GUIDE, at 125 (“Patients with anomalous fetuses may
find that the prospect of a prolonged induction and delivery compounds the
anguish of their decision and loss. … Grieving is important for the parents of an
anomalous fetus, and seeing and holding the fetus are important components of
healing. Their needs may be better met with an intact fetus (intact D&E
procedure).”).
148
Cf. Law, Childbirth (arguing for women’s right to make choices about how to
proceed with childbirth).
149
See MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1318 (stating that a woman’s decision to have
an abortion because “she cannot give this child a life” is “one of absolute realism
and deep responsibility as a mother”).
150
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 123, 1635 (2007) (quoting congressional
findings); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962-63 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citing AMA statements on intact D&E).
151
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 140.
152
The routine use of forceps to extract a baby during childbirth has been
thoroughly discredited. See Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to
Universal Legalization, 13 HEALTH MATRIX: JOURNAL OF LAW-MEDICINE 325,
345 n. 128 (collecting information about risks of unnecessary use of forceps); Law,
Childbirth, at 363-64 (“[R]outine care for normal childbirth [in the mid-twentiethcentury] required that the woman be sedated throughout labor, the baby removed
from the unconscious mother by forceps, an incision be made to facilitate use of
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This perspective on the natural birth process is, at best, a
medical one. One of the problems with both Carhart I and Carhart II
is that the party challenging the ban was not a woman claiming her
status as a moral actor but a doctor claiming his right to practice
medicine as he saw fit. His advocates pinned their arguments on the
doctor’s expertise rather than women’s moral status. In Carhart I,
Justice Kennedy complained that the majority reasoned entirely from
the perspective of the doctor, rather than the perspective of a
“shocked” society.153 He was right. To the question “who decides”
on the method of abortion, half the Court sided with the doctor, half
with society, and no one with the pregnant woman. Not until Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Carhart II was there any suggestion that she
might be an appropriate decision-maker.
The choice of abortion method is not only medical but also
moral and emotional. It is the sort of choice that adults make for
themselves and that parents make for their children. The moral and
emotional status of the woman/mother, however, were submerged by
both sides in Carhart I and Carhart II. Recognizing the moral,
parental aspect of the entire abortion decision, including the method,
would not necessarily change the outcome of Carhart II. The
Supreme Court has already held, in Washington v. Glucksburg,154
that the state may inflict intimate suffering to further its moral
interest in preserving life.155 But a model of pregnancy as parenting
would help redress the prevailing assumption of frivolity that
attaches to women’s abortion decisions.156

the forceps, and the placenta removed by injecting a drug (ergot). Because the
anesthetized woman might thrash about and injure herself, her arms and legs had to
be restrained.”).
153
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154
521 U.S. 702 (2007).
155
Justice Kennedy referred to Glucksburg in his opinions in both of the partialbirth abortion cases. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 158; Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 962. In
Glucksburg, the individual privacy right was balanced against state interests in
tangible consequences, such as possible coercion or euthanasia. In the Carhart
cases, however, the state’s interest was its generalized moral objection to intact
D&E, which was not clearly distinct from its moral objection to all abortions.
156
Cf. Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 416, 399-403.
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IV. THE DIALECTIC OF EQUALITY
Had women participated equally in designing laws, we might
now be trying to compare other relationships—employer and
employee, partners in a business, oil in the ground, termites
in a building, tumors in a body, ailing famous violinists and
abducted hostages forced to sustain them—to the
maternal/fetal relationship rather than the reverse.
—Catharine MacKinnon157
The comparison-based equality arguments discussed in Part II
are incomplete because they are single dimensional. Each gives only
a partial view of how forced pregnancy diminishes human dignity.
This partiality is a function of the search for a basis for comparison
to male experience on which to ground an equal protection analysis.
Pregnancy instead should be analyzed on its own terms, as a
biological and social process. As discussed in Part III, the Supreme
Court has already moved in that direction in the context of parental
rights. This Part explores some possibilities for analogizing to a
unified experience of pregnancy. It then suggests how such
arguments could support claims for an affirmative right to
reproductive freedom. Finally, it reflects on the limits of comparisonbased equality arguments when what is really at stake is women’s
liberty.
A. UNITARY COMPARISONS
The burdens of motherhood argument criticizes society for
forcing women to “become mothers” by imposing disproportionate
responsibility for taking care of children after they are born. A more
unified perspective on pregnancy and birth is that pregnant women
have already become mothers—in the social as well as biological
sense—by the time they give birth. Regardless of pressures from
society as a whole, the law does not force men to become fathers in
the same sense. Forced pregnancy can thus usefully be compared to
the types of parenting duties that family courts will and will not
require the parents of born children to perform. A second
comparison, which more thoroughly integrates the physical and the
social, is to a different kind of intimate relationship: one that may
arise when a person is held physically hostage to the needs of
another.
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MacKinnon, Reflections, at 1313-14.
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1.

Mandatory Visitation

While legal parenthood of a born child triggers a duty of
financial support, courts are loathe to impose a physical caretaking
burden on parents other than pregnant women. Through child support
requirements, the state forces only liability, not parenthood, onto
noncustodial parents. Visitation, and the caretaking relationship it
implies, is considered a right, not a duty.158 Faced with custodial
parents’ requests that another parent be required to take advantage of
visitation rights, courts have recoiled: “A court simply cannot order a
parent to love his or her children, or to maintain a meaningful
relationship with them.”159 While the law imposes child support
obligations based on a tort-like notion of causation, it does not force
noncustodial parents to engage in the caretaking work that is likely to
produce an emotional bond.
The mandatory visitation analogy improves on the burdens-ofmotherhood arguments because it draws a comparison between
forcing pregnancy and forcing a post-birth relationship with a child.
It also reveals a core shortcoming of the “male abortion” argument
focused on child support,160 which misses the difference between a
forced relationship and financial liability. This analogy suffers,
however, from some of the same flaws previously discussed. It
requires one to embrace the questionable premise that a person has
no legal duty to provide direct care for his or her child. In addition,
although the prospect of forced visitation raises a specter of physical
coercion, it is not comparable to the invasion of bodily integrity
involved in forced pregnancy.

158

See Daniel Pollack & Susan Mason, Mandatory Visitation, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
74, 74 (2004); Czapansky, Volunteers, at 1436-39 (describing courts’ entrenched
resistance to mandatory visitation). Cf. Siegel, Reasoning, at 377 (“Nor has the
legislature required that men fathering the children that women are forced to bear
assume primary responsibility for the work of nurturance and maintenance women
typically provide.”); Rubenfeld, Concurring, at 110 (“[H]aving forced an unwilling
woman to carry and bear, Texas cannot disclaim responsibility if, as a natural and
foreseeable consequence, the woman ends up feeling bound, by the deep
sentiments of love or duty that characteristically arise, to keep and raise her
child.”).
159
See Pollack & Mason, at 78 (quoting Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 2-00-005 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001); see also Anita L. Allen, Opinion Concurring in the Judgment, in
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 105 (noting that the state cannot force
a person to adopt a child, even to protect the sanctity of human life).
160
See supra, notes _ and accompanying text (discussing Ethan Leib’s argument
for a “man’s right to choose”).
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To bring the body back into play, one could turn to the oft-cited
example of organ donation or other medical procedure. No court or
legislature in the United States has ever ordered a parent to submit to
a medical procedure for the benefit of a born child. Yet they have so
ordered pregnant women for the benefit of fetuses, both through
abortion bans that mandate childbirth and through court-ordered
cesareans and other surgery.161 These comparisons, however, lack
the social element of pregnancy—even forced organ donation to a
child would not impose the intimate caretaking relationship of
pregnancy. The offense lies in the invasion of bodily integrity, again
neglecting the social aspect that is an important part of the right to
abortion.
2. Stockholm Syndrome
A better analogy may be to supplement Thomson’s violinist
analogy with more information about the likely non-physical effects
on the person serving as the violinist’s life-support system. In a
psychological phenomenon known as Stockholm Syndrome, people
who find themselves physically hostage to the interests of another
have been known to identify and sympathize with those interests.162
During the period of physical risk, this phenomenon is considered a
natural, adaptive method for surviving and for coping
psychologically with the captive state.163 Forced pregnancy creates
analogous conditions. The pregnant woman is physically hijacked to
serve the interests of the state, which purports to be acting on behalf
of the fetus. This circumstance forces her to develop a psychological
posture toward the fetus and the eventual child.164 Our violinist’s
life-support system is thus not merely physically kidnapped for nine
months’ service. She is put in a position in which it is likely that she
will identify with, care for, and develop a long-term emotional bond
with the violinist.165 For the involuntarily pregnant woman, that
161

See Burkstrand-Reid, Invisible Woman, at _.
See THOMAS STRENTZ, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRISIS NEGOTIATION 243245 (2006).
163
See id., at 245-46.
164
See Siegel, Reasoning, at 371- 72 (stating that a woman forced to carry a
pregnancy to term “is likely to form emotional bonds with a child during
pregnancy; she is likely to believe that she has moral obligations toward a born
child that are far greater than any she might have to an embryo/fetus”). Siegel
points out that “legislatures adopting restrictions on abortion both desire and
expect” this result. Id.
165
This is an alternative explanation for the claimed phenomenon that desire for an
abortion is merely a symptom of the emotional swings of pregnancy, and that
“birth of the child brings contentment.” Collett, Dissenting Opinion, at 192.
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adaptation to the captive state is reinforced by personal beliefs and
social norms about motherhood. If she is prevented from having an
abortion, it is preferable—not diagnosable as a “syndrome”—that
she develop a positive identification with the child, whether to rear
herself or to find a different home.
This analogy also provides a useful example of the need to
distinguish what is natural from what is desirable. A hostage’s
identification with her captors is natural in that it is recognized as a
normal, adaptive psychological response to physical captivity. The
response is adaptive in that it may actually increase the odds of
survival. “Natural,” however, does not mean “inevitable”: many
hostages do not experience Stockholm Syndrome. Moreover, once
the period of captivity is over, the response is no longer considered
desirable. To the contrary, it becomes a “syndrome” in need of
treatment.
With pregnancy, the social response is reversed: even after the
period of physical “captivity,” society usually favors and promotes
the mother’s identification with the infant’s needs.166 As I have said,
I agree with that societal preference; it bears emphasizing that this
analogy does not imply that a pregnant woman’s attachment to a
fetus or infant is a pathology. A woman seeking an abortion,
however, can be understood as analogous to a hostage seeking to
avoid the development of an attachment analogous to Stockholm
Syndrome. This analogy shows why the relationship theory of
pregnancy is consistent with a right to abortion: “When a woman
chooses abortion, she is choosing not to enter into a maternal
relationship. Women want access to safe abortions as quickly as
possible, before quickening, before a relationship can begin.”167 The
harm of forced pregnancy is not only the physical invasion evoked
by Thomson’s violinist analogy but also the creation of a strong
emotional relationship of identification.
Neither mandatory visitation nor the Stockholm Syndrome is, of
course, a perfect or even a very good analogy to pregnancy. They
have the advantage, however, of combining the physical and the
social aspects of pregnancy. They are therefore somewhat truer to the
experience of pregnancy than analogies that focus more exclusively
on the body or exclusively on social relationships. These two
analogies are also consistent with the Supreme Court’s use of
166

Unless perhaps she has previously signed a contract to turn the child over to
others. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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ROTHMAN, at 243.
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pregnancy as archetypal parenthood in the unwed father cases. This
resonance creates opportunities for developing a broader based
constitutional vision of reproductive freedom.
B. AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS
The unattained holy grail of abortion rights lawyering after Roe
was public funding of abortions for poor women. As the nation
lurches slowly toward universal health care, and as higher income
women gain better contraceptive care (and thus less need for
abortion), it becomes increasingly important to define the full-range
of reproductive health services as basic health care for women.
Specifically, the exclusion of abortion and other reproductive health
care from public health plans needs to be understood in a way that
triggers heightened scrutiny, both as a sex classification and as
implicating fundamental rights.
Even in the heyday of strict scrutiny for abortion restrictions, the
Supreme Court rejected all efforts to secure such funding and upheld
the specific exclusion of abortion services from Medicaid.168 Under
privacy doctrine, the government’s duty was merely to refrain from
interfering when a woman privately sought a doctor to perform an
abortion. Just as the freedom of speech does not mean that the
government must give a person a megaphone, the right to have an
abortion did not include the right to government assistance in
procuring one.169
The rejection of public funding was perceived to be a limit of
privacy doctrine, and many feminist lawyers believed that the Equal
Protection Clause would be a better path to funding.170 The state
action problem, however, remains. One problem with the equality
168

See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
see generally Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and Compulsory Maternity,
_ U. ILL. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2010).
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See McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18. Peggy Cooper Davis points out that Maher
went further, arguing not only that the state lacked a duty to fund abortion but also
“that it has a clear right to discourage abortion.” DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, at
203. This move set the stage for Casey to extend the state’s compelling interest in
fetal life back to the point of conception.
170
See, e.g., MCDONAGH, at 148-54 (arguing that her adaptation of the Good
Samaritan argument leads to the conclusion that government must fund abortion);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 384-85 (1985) (arguing that if Roe had been
decided using equality principles, the outcomes of McRae and Maher might have
been different). But see Allen, The Fix, at 545-55 (rebutting this claim and pointing
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arguments discussed in Part II—and with any equality argument for
public funding of poor women’s abortions—was that they assume a
governmental duty to accommodate de facto inequality. Under the
burdens-of-motherhood approach, for example, women have a right
to abortion because women are disproportionately and
discriminatorily saddled with responsibility for rearing children.171
That discrimination, however, is not attributable to the government
under the state action doctrine.172 Existing inequality in biology and
in social circumstances typically means that the government may
choose whether to level the playing field by, say, giving women
access to abortion.173
The unwed father cases, however, provide an opening for a
possible affirmative duty on the part of the government. A unified
vision of pregnancy brings abortion rights within the ambit of those
cases. The abortion right is closely related to the right at stake in the
unwed father cases, since abortion involves the parent-child
relationship as well as bodily integrity.174 In the fatherhood cases, the
state was required to accommodate biological sex inequality when it
acted to deny putative fathers of their liberty interest in the parentchild relationship. When the state restricts abortion, it also denies a
liberty interest, and might similarly be required to accommodate de
facto inequality in the context of reproductive rights.
C.

THE LIMITS OF EQUALITY

None of the equality arguments I have either criticized or
proposed rests on a perfect analogy between pregnancy and some
171

See, e.g., Balkin, Original Meaning, at 323-24 (arguing that abortion bans force
women to become mothers, which society links to disproportionate burdens with
respect to child care).
172
See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection, 16 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. _, _ (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the parallel treatment of biological
disadvantage and social inequality). The state action doctrine makes the
government accountable only for harms linked through a tight chain of causation to
specific, illegal acts of discrimination by the government. Everything else is
societal discrimination or structural inequality. When the purportedly natural
workings of society result in inequality, the government may choose whether to act
as a counter-weight. The difficulty of establishing an affirmative right to
government help is that government is not required to act without proof of fault
and immediate causation. See Jeffrey Rosen, Dissenting Opinion, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, at 173 (“[T]here are no formal barriers that keep
pregnant women from pursuing whatever occupations they choose. The pressures
that they feel are social, rather than legal.”).
173
See Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection, at _.
174
Cf. Hanigsberg, Homologizing, at 372 (1995) (“suggesting a connection
between motherhood and abortion”).
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other life experience. Pregnancy is unique, yet equality analysis
demands a comparison. If women’s unique fundamental rights have
been unrecognized, then one way to bring them into view is to make
them similar to experiences men could have. Finding a comparator is
difficult with an event so unique and so socially fraught as pregnancy
and birth.
Equality and equal protection mean, at a minimum, treating
“like things alike.” For a long time, the Supreme Court has added
“… and different things however you want.” Feminists have worked
hard to argue that the rule should instead be “like things alike, and
different things in appropriately different ways.” The difficulty is
that equality is an empty concept.175 To know what it means to treat
women equally with men in the context of reproduction, one needs to
have a substantive idea of what human dignity looks like for women.
The equality arguments for abortion try to defend abortion rights
by taking pieces of the problem and analogizing to general (male)
experience. One might think that a series of partial views could
eventually paint a picture of the whole, as with the blind men and the
elephant. In this case, however, the whole is being constructed not
merely from partial views but from partial views transformed by
analogy into something else. When we break the elephant into pieces
and subject them to this transformation, we could end up with a
giraffe. The flaws in the various equality arguments are thus deeper
than mere incompleteness. Each reveals an important aspect of the
problem, but the forced comparison to male experience also channels
how pregnancy and abortion themselves are understood.
One feature of analogies that seek to convey the harm of
unwanted pregnancy and motherhood is that they understandably
tend to portray pregnancy and motherhood in a negative light. That
might not be so bad; the point, after all, is that forced pregnancy is
bad. All of these arguments, however, create a context in which only
abortion is a protected right, at the expense of a broader conception
of reproductive freedom. For example, many of the equality
arguments were specifically designed to attack funding restrictions.
These arguments do a good job of showing why it is sex biased for a
state health care program to pay for the expenses of childbirth but not
the expenses of abortion. They may even convince you that it is sexbiased to rescue kidnapping victims but refuse to rescue involuntarily

175
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pregnant women.176 Unfortunately, they are poorly suited to
demonstrate why the reverse—say, funding abortion but not
childbirth—would be equally horrid. Equality is not merely empty
but in some ways a risky as a method for theorizing women’s basic
human rights with respect to reproductive freedom.
CONCLUSION
Equality analysis yields valuable insights into the state’s
willingness to force women to bear children and the role that policy
plays in maintaining inequalities. Equality analysis, however,
requires comparison, which in turn requires reframing pregnancy,
abortion, and motherhood in ways that are comparable to male
experiences. Often, the analysis proceeds by splitting apart the
biological and social components of pregnancy. This initial step
channels the discussion further and further from the reality of
pregnancy, in which those components are inextricably intertwined,
producing a rights discourse that remains rooted in men’s
experiences even as it speaks the language of sex equality.
The pitfalls of both the body-focused and the burdens-ofmotherhood equality arguments teach two lessons for constructing a
feminist theory of reproductive freedom. First, feminists should
avoid bifurcating pregnancy into physical and social components.
The right to abortion is unitary and rests not on two distinct freedoms
but on their inseparability. Any comparative analysis should include
both aspects, or, if focused on just one, acknowledge its
incompleteness. Second, equality analysis in this context should be
undertaken as a method for revealing the legal system’s omission of
women’s concerns, not as the final stage of defining the scope of
reproductive human rights. The risk of mistaking the strategy for the
goal is that women’s rights will continue to be defined as derivative
of what the law has already deemed fundamental for men.
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